2. Rejection of the Opinion

11. Against this: a lie, as was said in d.14 q.1 nn.17, 30, 34, can be understood, in relation to the issue at hand, in two ways, when speaking of actual sin, of course: in one way the actual disorder, in the other way the obligation to penalty following the act. The first is called ‘fault in act’, the second ‘guilt following from the fault’. Now the wrongness that properly is of a nature to be in the act does not properly remain after the act: first because a privation of a nature to be in a proper and determinate subject does not properly remain without that subject; second because then opposites could exist at the same time. For if some disorder proper to the fault of fraternal hatred remained after the act, and enjoyment of the same brother were to follow later, opposite faults would exist at the same time, because immoderate hatred and immoderate enjoyment of the same person would remain. By this fact, then, is what was said there true [ibid. n.34], that after an act of sin passes away nothing besides habitual injustice, that is, lack of grace, remains in the soul save the proper obligation to the penalty corresponding to the actual sin.

12. From this follows that the aforesaid reason [n.10] does not prove the point at issue, because if it be speaking of the disorder or wrongness that is in the actual fault, it is doubtful whether it proves that that cannot return; but the question in the point at issue is not about that but about the obligation to penalty.

13. And the proof drawn from Augustine [n.10] is not valid, because although a man through God’s authorship not become worse with the evil of fault, yet he can become bad with the evil of penalty and be much more obligated to penalty, since no one is justly obligated to a penalty save by act of God’s will.

14. Again, God can obligate this person at time b to the same penalty that he obligates him to at time a; therefore this person also can be obligated to the same penalty and consequently have the same guilt (and I call a and b instants between which succeeds an intermediate time in which he is not thus obligated). The proof of the antecedent is that my will too can want this, namely to want first to order this person to a penalty and second to want not to order him to a penalty under this condition, namely if he not offend again; and if he do offend again, to want from that point to order him to the same penalty.

15. If you say that my will in this is not just and consequently the like cannot belong to the divine will - on the contrary, Gratian Decretum p.2 cause 12 q.2 ch.58, “he who has been set free can again, because of ingratitude, be justly subjected justly to the penalty of servitude;” therefore similarly in the issue at hand.

16. If it be said that this reasoning does not prove that the same obligation in number returns to the same penalty in number, although an obligation to the same penalty in number return (for these are diverse: ‘obligation to the same penalty’ and ‘the same obligation to the same penalty’; and there is confirmation, because God’s volition to inflict a penalty on this person at time a and time b is not the same volition in idea, although it be the same volition in reality, for a divine volition is different in idea according to diversity of objects) - on the contrary: if he not be penitent in the intermediate time, not only would an obligation remain to the penalty but also the same obligation; but whatever God can do concerning a creature while some continuation remains that is no part of what is willed, that can he do with the continuation removed, because it is not anything of the essence of what is willed;     therefore etc     .